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IN THE SUP·REME CO·URT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CONSTANCF: H. BARRETT,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
--vs.ROBERT MICHAEL BARRETT,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case
No.10268

BRIEF O·F APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for divorce wherein the plaintiff
hy her complaint seeks a divorce, custody of the minor
child of the parties, support money, alimony, and a division of property.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The lower court determined that the plaintiff was entitled to and granted her a divorce, awarded her custody of the minor child of the parties, the sum of $200.00
each month as support money for the minor child, the
sum of $250.00 until her death or remarriage as alimony,
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judgment in the sum of $1:::i,OOO as a division of property,
and $1,750.00 as attorney's fees.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
This appeal is taken by the defendant and seeks a
determination by this romt that the plaintiff has not
proved grounds for clivorce in the manner required by
law, and that her complaint shoulcl have been dismissed;
or in the alternative, that the award to the plaintiff of
the sum of $250.00 each month as alimony and $5,000 of
the $15,000.00 judgment awarded to the plaintiff was
excessive as a matter of la\v and should be vacated ancl
set aside.
STATEJ\fENT OF FACTS
The parties to this action were married on October
21, 1961, at Acapulro, Mexico ( R. 94, L. 20). The plaintiff at the time of this marriage had four children by a
previous marriage betweeu the ages of nine and two years
(R. 96, L. 1-5 ), having been divorced from her former
husband in April of 19GO (R. J31, L.11-15). The defendant had had two prior marriages, and had three children
by his first marriage and one child by the second (R. 96,
L. 25). At the time of this marriage, the plaintiff was 32
years of age, and the defendant was 49 years of age ( R.
115, L. 11-14). Following the marriage, the parties took
up residence in Las Vegas, Nevada (R. 99, L. 2-5). The
parties separated little more tha11 three months following
their marriage, in the latter part of .Jannary or the first
part of February of l9G2 (R. 136, L. 17-22), and the
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plaintiff returned to Salt Lake City, Utah. The parties
Imm been separated since 1\Irs. Barrett left Las Vegas
(R. 136, L. 23-25). A child was was born to the parties on
.Jnne 19, 1962 (R. 99, L. 19). This action \vas commenced
011 M ny 8, 1963, in the District Court of Salt Lake County.
Following the framing of issues and employment of discovery procedures hy the parties, a pretrial was held J\fay
18, 1964, the pretrial order reciting in part (R. 48) :
''In this case the defenda11t will not offer contradictory e\-idence if the plaintiff can show grounds
for divorce, provided that his failing to so offer
will not be consiuered hy the court as a basis for
any punitiYe measures to be taken against him in
the division of property or awarding of alimony
or support.''
The pretrial order also recited that the property agreemrnt entered into by the parties at the time of the marriage and written in Spanish (R. 29) was correctly interpreted in English in the defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's ~lotion for Production of Documents (R. 35, 36).
The matter was tried August 6, 1964. The plaintiff
commenced her testimony, and in support of her claim
of cruelty testified in generalities which were primarily
condnsiom; (R. 99, L. 26 to R. 100, L. 20) as to the "inconsiderate, tyrannical and dictatorial" behavior of the
clefemlant, then qualified her testimony with justification of the defendant's behavior (R. 100, L. 21-24) and his
pro hlems leading to it. When asked to testify specifically,
the plaintiff refused (R. 100, L. 26-29, 30; R. 101, L. 29;
R. 102, L. G, 21-22; R. 103, L. 1, 2, 18-20). When pressed
3

by her counsel and by the Court for specific testimony
concerning her claimed grounds, the plaintiff stated that
she did not want a divorce ( R. 103, L. 14; R. 104, L. 10).
The Court then stated that the complaint was dismissed
(R. 104, L. 12). After further conversation, a recess was
taken and upon resumption of testimony the plaintiff
was asked again if she wanted a divorce. At this time
she repeated that she did not (R. 104, L. 30; R. 105, L.
20-22, L. 30). After discussion between the Court and
her counsel, the plaintiff again testified as to the justification of the def end ant's claimed acts of cruelty (R.
108, L. 30 to 109, L. 4; R. 109, L. 28 to R. 110, L. 3). The
plaintiff then testified as to an occasion (R. 111, L. 22 to
R. 112, L. 12) which apparently was being developed as a
claimed act of cruelty. However, when asked by her
counsel the somewhat leading question (R. 113, L. 4):
Q.

Did you feel that you were frequently imposed upon sexually in your home~

The plaintiff replied:
A.

That's very a difficult question.
for the most part my

I enjoyed

Q. Did you find . . .
A. . .. sexual encounters with Mr. Barrett. I
did feel on a few occasions that he was animal ... rather animal like in his approaches,
hut that's ...
Q. All right.

On this state of the record, the Court interposed as follows (R. 113, L. 22):
THE CouRT: lt may be that counsel will stipulate
that grounds for (livorce have now been shown.
4

MR. BELESS: I will stipulate Your Honor1

what was that,

THE CouRT: That the lady has shown grounds
which would support and sustain a divorce.
l\In. BELEss: Yes, I will so stipulate.
THE CouRT: All right. Let's get on to the matter
of finances.
!\In. Mcl\IunnAY: The real problem.
The plaintiff then testified that at the time of her marriage to the def enclant she had been employed as secretary to the department head of the State Department of
Public Instruction and was earning $350 a month (R. 115,
L. 4). Prior to that she had been the Assistant Manager
of the Alpine Rose Lodge earning $400 a month, together
with $50 a month expenses (TR. 114, L. 26). At this
time she had a <laughter two years of age-"Old enough
to put in the nursery" (R. 134, L. 1). She owned an
interest in certain real property acquired in the divorce
from her former husband, which she valued at about
$7,000 (R. 114, L. 10). She was receiving, and presently
receives $50 per month support money for each of her
four children by her previous marriage, or $200 each
month. In addition she receives $50 each month if and
when she moves from the property owned by herself and
her former husband jointly (R. 115, L. 25). The plaintiff testified that her present living quarters were "socially a devastating situation" (R. 120, L. 6) and that
she had found an apartment which she felt was adequate
for "large family" (R. 122, L. 9, 18) which rented for
$200 a month. Realizing that this was not all Mr. Bar5

rett's family (R. 122, L. 10) she felt that it would he
reasonable that he contribute only three-fourths or $150
(R. 122, L. 29) of this rent. 8he then testified that ·was
she really needed was a home adequate for herself and
Michelle ''and the other children'' ( R. 123, L. 2) and
requested that the court award her sufficient monies to
purchase one. The plaintiff then teRtified to her modest
needs, which included, among other items, ( R. 123, 12,1,
125 ), $150 a month for food for she and the minor chikl
(R. 123, L. 26) and $30 to $100 for miscellaneous activities, recreation, etc. (R. 125, L. 4-6). However, it is
significant that the plaintiff testified that as to her four
children by the lH'evious marriag0 "their father provides for them adequately'' by paying the sum of $50 for
each child as child support (R. 121, L. 3). Apparently,
the plaintiff is in good health, and she testified that the
child ·was in good health (R. 139, L. 22). Although she
was employed prior to this marriage, she does not feel
at this time that she has any reason to seek employment
(R. 133, L. 7, 13). The plaintiff then testified aR to the
a<'quisition of a diamond ring (R. 126, L. 10-24). The
ring was purchased January 12, 1862, (R. 159, L. 4) apparently, a matter of two to four weeks (R. 136, L. 17-22)
before the plaintiff left the clefe1Hlant and returned to
Salt Lake City. The defendant's version of this purchase was somewhat different than that of the plaintiff.
·when asked if the ring had been purchased as a ·wedding
ring, he stated (R. 158, L. 21):

"No. It was purehasf~d agai11Rt my will. I mYed
money, and that 'NaR more or less 0110 of these unkind things, lm;'i11g big liomes an cl big rings."
6

E\·ide11ee \ms then adduced with reference to the
financial situation of tlte defendant (Exhibits P-4, P-5 ).
\Yhile the defendant has substantial assets, the record
<loes 11ot iw1icate that he is the "retired multimillionaire"
that the plaintiff assumed she \ms marrying (R. 115, L.
20). These ('XhihitR show that Barrett Investment Company, of whieh the defendant is for practical purposes
the sole stockholdN, had a negatiYe net worth and
\ms inclehted to the clefenclant in an amount slightly less
than 011e a11cl 011e-half million dollars. Exhibit P-5 listed varionR assets owned by the clef endant, all of which
are shown hy tl1e Exhibit to lw pledg<'d as security for a
loa11. 'l'he net af',sets haw~ a book yalue or $255,084.87,
Rnhjert to the note of the defendant in the amount of
$141,624.72. 'l'he def enc1ant teRtifiecl as to his lack of u
n•g-ular inrome (R. 150, L. 23), his obligations ( R. 151,
L. fi-29), and the lnck of present values in the real estate
de:-;crihcd i11 Exhibit P-5 (R. 153, L. 2-8). The court
fouwl as a F'inding of Fart that the defendant "had property interests and holdings exceeding $1,250,000. '' (R.
75). Plaintiff's counsel qurstionecl the defendant at some
l<•ngth coneerning vohmtary proYisions he had made for
his chil<lreu hy his previous two marriages (R. 144, L.
3 to R. 14G, L. 12). These provisions for his older chil<heu lrnd heeu made years previous to the trial of this
present action and under different financial, as well as
p0rno11a1, eircumstanees, the most recent being in April
of 1935 (R. 14G, L. 2). While it would appear that these
matters ~were entirely immaterial, nevertheless they were
rPlierl npon by the court and received its first attention
in n dt'tnmination of the issueR upon the parties sub-
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mitting the matter (R. 163, L. 21). At the conclusiou
of the evidence the court awarded the plaintiff the sum of
$15,000, $250 a month alimony, $200 a month support
money, attorneys' fees in the sum of $1,750. The diamond ring was awarded to the defendant.
Following the entry of judgment, counsel for the defendant filed his withdrawal (R. 82). Present counsel
entered his appearance (R. 79), and a .Motion for New
Trial was filed (R. 81). Plaintiff's Motion for a New
Trial was denied (R. 87), and the plaintiff was allowed
to reopen and give testimony concerning the antenuptial
agreement entered into by the parties at the time of the
marriage (R. 168-201). The court found the issues in
favor of the plaintiff (R. 196, 197), finding that the
agreement was unfair "for the wealth Mr. Barrett had"
(R. 196, L. 28), and further that the plaintiff did not
understand the agreement (R. 197, L. 1). The defendant
thereupon filed this appeal.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN ACCEPTING THE
STIPULATION OF COUNSEL THAT THE
PLAINTIFF HAD, BY HER TESTIMONY,
SHOWN GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE; AND IN
THE ABSENCE OF SUCH STIPULATION,
THE EVIDENCE FAILS TO SHOW THAT
THE PLAINTIFF WAS EWl1ITLED TO A
DIVORC:BJ.
8

The controlling statute, with reference to grounds
for divorce and proving of the same, 30-3-4 Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended, is as follows:
'' 30-3-4 PLEADINGS - FINDINGS - DECREE. - The
complaint shall be in writing and signed by the
plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney. No decree of divorce shall be granted upon default, or otherwise, except upon legal evidence taken in the cause,
and all hearings and trials for divorce shall be
had before the court, and not before a master,
referee or any other delegated representative,
and the court in all divorce cases shall make and
file its findings and decree upon the evidence."
(Emphasis added)
Upon the evidence adduced in this matter, as reflected
in the transcript herein, the court entered its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law. The finding made by the
court with reference to the plaintiff's grounds for divorce
is as follffws (R. 74, 75):
'' 5. The plaintiff and defendant resided together
as husband and wife for a period of approximately five months following their marriage. Almost
immediately following the marriage, and particularly when it became apparent that the plaintiff
was pregnant, the defendant's attitude towards
her took on a marked change. No longer was the
plaintiff the object of the defendant's love, affection and attention, but instead she found herself
rejected, cast aside and treated with contempt.
The defendant on more than one occasion threatened the plaintiff with physical harm and injury
which he was quite capable of inflicting. The defendant has refused to continue to reside with
the plaintiff, has insisted upon a divorce and wants
nothing more to do with the plaintiff. All of the
9

foregoing conduct on the part of the defendant
has and does constitute cruel treatment of the
plaintiff and haR caused her great mental <listress
and anguish. Counsel for the partieR stipulated
that the foregoing constituted grounds for
divorce.''

It is submitted that the foregoing facts, as found, are
not supported, and in fact are in large measure negated
by the record in this case. Further, it is suhmitteu that
the concluding statement of this finding, to-wit, "Counsel for the parties stipulated that tlrn foregoing constituted grounds for divorce'' enlarges upon the purported
stipulation ·which was stated by the court as follows
(R. 13, L. 22):
''THE CouRT: It may be that counsel will stipulate that grounds for diYorce have now been
showu.''

It would seem apparent that the attempted stipulation
was not and was not intended to he an agreement by the
parties, that the plaintiff had, in fact, made out the
grounds for divorce as cited in this fimliug, but was
rather in fact an admission by the court and counsel
that grounds for divorce had not been made out, could
not be made out at this stage of the record unless the
plaintiff were to impeach her owu testimony, and that
the stipulation ·was in lieu of evid0nce rather than an
acknowledgment that evideuce hau been produced. rrhe
court itself appeared to acknowledge this state of the
record, in halting cross-examination of the plaintiff by
counsel for the defoud::rnt coneerning- lic·r trips to Salt
Lake City during tlw marriage as follows (H. UG, L. 5):
JO

'' 'l'HE CouRT: Why are we leading into this~ Are
we trying to show that she is not entitled to divorce? You could talk me out of it if you want to.
J\In. BELESS: I just want to show that her relationship ~s still in Salt Lake City and really what this
marriage was ...
J\ln. ~Ic.MunRAY: Well then, I object to it because
he has already stipulated there is grounds for
divorce so all we ought to be talking about are
matters that pertain to property matters.
THE CouRT: I think so.''
Present counsel is concededly in the unhappy position
of attacking a purported stipulation made by his predecessor, and apparently relied on by the court. However,
it is submitted that the matters attempted to be stipulated to in this instance are not the type of matter ordiuarily stipulated to by counsel a11d to which stipulations
counsel, his client, and any successor counsel should as
a matter of proper practice be bound. The attempted
stipulation in this instance was one which, under the
statute, counsel is "·ithout authority to enter into, and
the court is ~without authority to accept. Such a stipulation is not as in the ordinary case, an agreement by all
parties as to existing facts, but under the circumstances
of the instant case is an admission that the necessary
facts do not exist, or in any eYent have not been proven,
aml is routrary to the wording as well as the spirit of
the statute, which requires as a matter of public policy
that no decree of diYorce shall be granted other than
"upon legal evidence taken in the cause." The plaintiff
havi11g completely failed to prove, either that she was
11

entitled to or wanted a divorce, was not entitled to the
granting of one, and the complaint should have been dismissed as the court itself indicated in the early stages of
the proceedings (R. 104, L. 12).
POINT II.
THE COUR.T ERR.ED IN AW ARD ING TO THE
PLAINTIFF ALIMONY IN THE SUM OF
$250.00 EACH MONrrH UNTIL HER DEATH
OR. RE.MAR.RIAG E.
This court has on numerous occasions made the observation that on the question of alimony, while each
case relies substantially on its own facts, and that the
decision of the trial court should he given great weight,
that nevcrtheleess, this court has authority to modify a
decree in appropriate cases. See Pinion v. Pinion, 67
Pac. 2nd 265, 92 Utah 26;), McDonald Y. McDonald, 236
Pac. 2nd 1066, 120 Utah 573, and the numerous cases
therein cited. In each of the cases cited, this court has
set out the elements which should he taken into consideratio11 by the Court as governing its discretion in this
regard. In applying these elements in turn to the facts
of the instant case, no authority is found for the grantin~
of alimony, and particularly permanent alimony, under
a fact situation as is here presented.
The elements to be co11sidcrcd in determining the
question of alimony include the amouut and kind of property ff\Vned by each of the parties and whether the property belonged to the parties before coverture or was accumulated jointly, the ability and opportuuity of each of
12

the spouses to earn money, the financial station and
necessities of each party, the health of the parties, the
duration of the marriage, what the wife might have given
up by the marriage, and age of the parties when they
married.
In this case, the court found the defendant to have a
net worth of $1,250,000. The plaintiff owns an undivided interest with her former husband in certain Salt
Lake County real property, which she valued at $7,000.
All of the property of each of the parties was accumulated prior to the marriage, and no property was accumulated by the parties during the marriage. At the time of
the marriage, the plaintiff was employed as Secretary
to the department head of the State Department of Public Instruction, and was earning $350.00 per month (R.
115, L. 4). Prior to that she had been the assistant manager of the Alpine Rose Lodge and was earning $400.00
per month, together with $50 a month expenses (R. 114,
L. 126). At this time she had a daughter two years of
age - "old enough to put in the nursery" (R. 134, L. 1).
The standard of living enjoyed by the plaintiff during
the brief period that the parties lived together, does
not appear clear from the record, though as the court
stated in Pinion v. Pinion, supra, "He would not be
obligated in this sort of a marriage to keep her for the
duration of her life to this standard.'' The marriage in
Pinion v. Pinion lasted four years, this marriage lasted
less than four months. With reference to the other elements to be considered in the determination of the questiou of alimony, the plaintiff gave up nothing other than
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The plaintiff came into this marriage a woman who
was required. to work to support her four children by a
marriage that had ended in divorce. Within four months
8he left this marriage and returned. to Salt Lake City.
With reference to what the plaintiff might have
"given up" for this marriage, during the short period
of time that ihe parties resided in Las Vegas, the plaintiffmade an undetermined number of trips to Salt Lake
City (R. 135, L. 1). The plaintiff could not recall that
the defendant objected "a great deal" to these trips
though H8 to her trips during the Christmas holidays he
"may have been offended" (R. 125, L. 25-28). Also, on
the day that the plaintiff and defendant separated, the
plaintiff telephoned her former husband in Salt Lake
City (R. 110, L. 9-14) and requested that he send her
ear down. The Court refused to allow the defendant's
counsel to examine the plaintiff concerning these trips,
the plaintiff's relationship in Salt Lake City, and the
actual status of this marriage for the reason that grounds
for divorce had been stipulated to (R. 136,, L. 5-15).
A distinguishing factor in this ease is that there is a
child horn of the marriage. However, the defendant has
i1e'l-er denied his obligation to support this child, and has,
i11 fact, agreed to pay an amount as child support substantially in exeess of the amount which the plaintiff feels
is adequate for the support of her children by the first
marriage. It would seem obvious that the child of this
marriage will not be raised in the same household with
her half sisters \\'ith a pecuniary standard of living four
15

times that of the other ehilclren, and the defendant is
well aware that his coutrihution to the support of this
chil<l will undoubtedly, iu fact, contribute to the ·welfare
of the plaintiff's children b~, her former marriage a8
well as the plaintiff herself. This ·would appear inevitable, and an attempt to arrange the situation othenYise
·would probably not be in the best interest of this child
or anyone else involved.
However, under the circumstances anrl. the facts of
this case, the award granted hy the trial court goes far
beyond doing equity to the parties and instead attempts
to apply a pecuniary balm to the sensitivities of the
plaintiff, apparently found by the trial court to have been
bruised in some manner whi.eh the record leaYes far from
clear.

POINrr TII.
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE
PLAINTIFF THE SUl\i OF $15,000.00 AS A DIVISION OF PROPER'l'Y.
The plaintiff testified (R. 123, L. 4-20) that because
of her circumstances she uecdcd a home and that (R.
123, L. 10).
"I suppose with the equity I have in Spring Lane,
it is possible to obtain, that our determination of
$17 ,000 should be enough.''
Q. You are asking i he court to a ward. you a sufficent amount which coupled with the equity you
now have to give yon a home?

A.

Yes, I would appreciate it, yPs.

16

The court in rendering a decision (R. 164, L. 26) stated:

''I thought he ought to give her $10,000 towards
the buying of a home. She has a $7,000 equity in
this duplex that she now has, and maybe a little
more than that with these parcels of land because
she owns half of two parcels and only a third in
the one.''
After further discussion and argument the court stated
as follows (R. 165, L. 17):
''THE CouRT: I think I ought to give her $15,000.
'I'hat would pay her well. Her station in life has
been changed by marrying him, the hopes she had
of living and shining and wearing this diamond
around. I think she is well taken care of if I give
her $15,000, $250 a month alimony while she is
single, $200 a month support for the child, give
the gentlemen the ring, and give her counsel fees,
costs in the amount of $1750, ano wish them
God speed. I ·would do about as well as I could
do this. That will be the order of the Court.''

ln Foreman v. Foreman, 176 Pac. 2nd 144, 111 Utah
72, this court set out in its opinion the language of the
trial judge as follows:
''As far as I am concerned, she has $1,800 in
cash and I think that would well pay the lady for
such heart balm as she might be in need of, and
that would avoid the necessity for my going into
that.''
To this and other language of the trial court quoted, this
court observ0d:
"It would seem from a reading of the above statements that what the court was attempting to do
17

here was compensa tc i\f rs. Foreman for her suffering of the paugs of m1requited love- heart
lJalm - and tearh l\lr. Foreman a lesson in marriage. Neither task is properly \Yithin the issues
of a diYorce case such as this.''
The language of the trial jrnlge quoted ahon· lrns a
striking similarity to the s!atc>me11t of

tlH~

same trial

judge in the instant ease. Tl1e *10,000 award first coutemplated by the court "·as co11sin1ed by the court to he
paymcut for the valm' of the dimnoud rillg acquired li;·
the parties during the mmTiag('. ·while the eirenmstanees under which tlw riug wns acqnire<l \\'l'l'C' soml'what in dispute (Cf. R. Hi-J-, L. :22; R. 126, L. 17), eoncl•ding for the pnqiose of argmnent tlia! tl1<' court acted
withiu the bounds of its discretion in tnrnnling the plaintiff the \'al ne of this i·ing, or $10,000, the rero11sider<1 ti on
by the court, and th0 gratuitous inrn•m'.<' of this amom1t
to $13,000, noh\·itl1:-;tarnli11g that the plaiutiff herself 11ml
testified that the amount needed hy h<>r to purcha;;.:p a
home was $10,000, \ms an attempt lo (as the rourt itself
stated) "pay h0r well," similar to that nitieizcd and re,·ersr•cl hy this ('Onrt in Fore111011 ,,._ Fure.mm1.

In conrlusion, i! is sul:mittPcl tl1nt tliP reeord in this
rase cloes uot support th<> fii:diug- nf the trial conrt that
the plaintiff had eFdahlished grounds for divorce aml
accon1ingly, thC' ('OmplniJJt of tl1t' plaintiff shonld haw
been dismiss0d. In t ]Jp ;d tern a tin, t11 is record does not
support a finding that the plaintiff \\'as elltitle<l to an
18

award of alimony nor an award of property to the plaintiff as was awarded by the trial court. The matter should
Le remanded with directions to dismiss the complaint
of the plaintiff. In the alternative, the award to the
plaintiff of the sum of $250 each month as alimony should
be vacateu and set aside, and the award of $15,000 given
the plaintiff as a division of property should be reduced
to the sum of $10,000.
Respectfully Submitted,
LEE W. HOBBS
1119 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah

.Attorney for .Appellant

19

